Significant differences in firm capital structure persist across countries. Recent studies show that country-specific factors still play a crucial role in explaining the cross-country differences in corporate financial structure, even after controlling for economic and financial factors. Differences in institutional backgrounds such as the bankruptcy law, legal system origin, and investor protection across countries are important determinants of corporate finance patterns (See Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Alves and Ferreira, 2007; and Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen, 2008) . On the other hand, various non-economic factors such as culture contribute to international divergence in both institutional settings and corporate financing policies (see Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; and Griffin, Li, Yue, and Zhao, 2008) .
In this paper, we examine whether corporate headquarters locations affect capital structure of large U.S. firms with easier access to external financing and with well-established capital structure policies. Focusing only on U.S. firms helps control for differences in country infrastructures that may influence corporate finance practices. We use the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to define the location of corporate headquarters. Our empirical analysis examines the joint significance of MSA effects specifically on firms' leverage and cash holding policies for the period 1988 to 2003. Results show strong evidence that corporate headquarters locations have a significant impact on corporate financial structure, even after controlling for firm-specific and time-varying characteristics, as well as industry effects. Corporations located in the same MSA have similar leverage ratios and similar levels of cash holdings, suggesting that corporate headquarters location helps explain the cross-sectional variation of firm capital structure in the United States.
The remaining part of the paper focuses on understanding what causes the location effect on corporate finance structure policies. While our various tests show that both economic and noneconomic factors contribute to the location effect, the overall evidence suggests that local and social interactions among corporate managers significantly influence corporate policies of firms headquartered in the same MSA. This evidence is consistent with social interaction theory, which suggests that an individual's preference or decision-making is often influenced by the actions of a reference group who typically includes an individual's family, neighbors, friends, or peers.
Agents learn from observing choices by other agents, and thus analogy plays an important role in perceiving and framing the decision situation (e.g., Markman and Moreau, 2001 ). The role of peer effects in corporate practices has been studied extensively recently; examples of such studies include peer effects in corporate governance (John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008; Davis and Greve, 1997) , corporation decisions (Granovetter, 1985) , compensation policy (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009 ), corporate borrowing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 2003) acquisition decision (Haunschild, 1993) , charitable actions (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2005) , and political contributions (Mizruchi, 1989 and 1992) .
We start to examine whether the location effect is driven by local economic factors, specifically local credit market development and state laws. We test whether variation in the financial sector development across MSAs can explain the location effects on firm financing policies.
Existing studies document a link between the functioning of a local financial sector and local individual firms' financial and investment policies (Zarutslie, 2006) . In our analysis, we construct three variables to measure the commercial bank conditions of each MSA, namely bank loan quality, size or depth of the financial sector, and the extent of bank competition. Results show that credit market conditions, while significantly related to both firm policies, do not alter the importance of the location effect on corporate finance structure practices.
We further test whether a state's business corporation statutes would affect the leverage and cash holding policies of public firms incorporated in the state. State statutes are acknowledged to be an important determinant of corporate policies (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Garvey and Hanka, 1999) . We create an antitakeover index and a payout restriction variable for each state to proxy for the variation in antitakeover statutes and payout restriction laws across states. Our analysis indicates that state statutes have significant joint effects on corporate leverage but not cash holdings, and that state statutes do not subsume the location effect. The evidence is also robust to separate subsamples of firms incorporated in Delaware and firms headquartered in California; these firms are subject to other state policies that may possibly affect their leverage ratios and cash holdings.
Second, we examine whether the location effect is associated with local investor preferences.
Finance theories predict that firms take into account investors' demand when they make corporate decisions. Previous studies suggest that investors exhibit a local bias in their investment portfolios. Both professional money managers and individual investors show some degree of preference for geographically proximate investments. 1 Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner (2010) find evidence of local clientele effects on dividend policies. Firms located in areas with many seniors, on average, have high dividend yields and a high propensity to pay and to initiate dividends. These findings suggest that the investors' preference for dividend payments could possibly reduce the leverage ratio and increase cash holdings. Motivated by these findings, we hypothesize that the local bias exhibited in the investment behavior of investors might influence corporations' policies. We use two income variables at the MSA level, per capita personal income and per capita investment income, as proxies for local investor characteristics. We find some evidence that these variables are related to corporate financing polices.
Finally, we examine whether the location effect could be shaped by non-economic factors, particularly local culture and social interactions. Culture is "transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behavior" (see Boyd and Richerson, 1985) . Cultural theorists (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1999; House, et al., 2004) suggest that culture and social factors are slow-moving components in the social structure, and that they are relevant to situations involving human decision-making interaction and also to economics. The economic relevance of cultural values can be demonstrated from two perspectives. First, cultural values involve institutions such as financial systems and legal systems of a society. Second, cultural aspects may influence preferences and attitudes of individual decision-makers. 2 The role of culture in economics/finance is also well established and receives much attention in recent years, and a thorough review of this strand of literature is contained in Breuer and Quinten (2009) . 3 We particularly focus on two cultural traits, trust 1 See Coval and Moskowitz (1999) for evidence on institutional investors, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu (2002) for evidence on individual investors, and Massa and Simonov (2006) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) for international evidence.
2 See the economic institutions model of Williamson (2000) . 3 For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Chui, Titman, and Wei (2008) provide evidence on the cultural effects on investors' behavior in stock markets; Griffin, Li, Yue, and Zhao (2008) show the impact of the cultural background of managers on capital structure decision making. and religion, that have been shown to be associated with an individual's attitude towards risk, thereby influencing corporate behavior. 4 Using the information from World Value Surveys, we design three measures -interpersonal trust, church attendance, and the percentage of Protestants -at the regional level and directly examine the impact of these proxies on corporate policies.
Our results suggest that these regional culture attributes can, in part, explain the location effect.
On the other hand, social interactions can help transmit "knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behavior" within generation and particularly within social networks. Particularly, managerial interaction can be facilitated by local community through two channels: face-toface information transmission and observational learning. Managers who work in the same geographic area normally have many opportunities to establish networks and build valuable relationships with peers. Such networks facilitate exchanging of ideas and learning from each other's experience. We hypothesize that social interactions are more important at the local than regional level and that other socioeconomic factors are more important at the regional than local level. We employ the nine regions defined by Census Bureau as an aggregate proxy for socioeconomic factors and hence, include region fixed effects to capture any possible variation with respect to income characteristics, industrial compositions of the employed labor force, and noneconomic factors such as demographic, social, and cultural characteristics among regions.
We find that the differences in socioeconomic characteristics can explain part of the variation in corporate policies, but that they cannot subsume the MSA effect of the local commonality in either leverage or cash holdings. Taken together, these results imply that the location effect is mainly due to the local "community" effect, which largely facilitates social interactions among corporate managers and hence, play an important role in shaping corporate policies.
Our findings contribute to the literature along several dimensions. First, our study shows a significant local commonality in corporate capital structure that is unexplained by firm and industry characteristics. This evidence adds to the literature on the relevance of geography for firm behavior. That is, geography matters for firm dividend policies (John, Knyazeva, Knyazeva, 4 Miller and Hoffmann (1995) , Osoba (2003) , Hillary, Paris, and Hui (2008) find a negative relation between religiosity and the degree of risk aversion. Hillary et al. (2008) further suggest that higher levels of religiosity lead to lower firm investment rates and lower long-term growth rates. Trust leads to risk taking. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show that interpersonal trust affects individuals' risk taking and thereby their investment behavior, whereas La Porta et al. (1997) find that trust helps cooperation in performance of large organizations.
2008; Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner, 2007; Graham and Kumar, 2006) , for financing practices (Loughran, 2008) , and for compensation plans (Francis, Hasan, John, and Waismann, 2007) .
Second, the current analysis deepens our understanding of non-economic determinants of capital structure. Existing studies show that cultural differences across countries contribute to the differences in financial systems and corporate financial structure and that corporate executives have significant impacts on corporate policies. While our study follow the insights of these two strands of literature, our work provides a link between the two. We show that local culture and social interaction among corporate executives are important determinants of corporate financial structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the sample selection process and defines the main variables of interest. Section II outlines the empirical framework and also examines the significance and magnitude of location effects on corporate financial policy. Section IV addresses the possible omitted variable problem, including bank conditions at the metropolis level and statutes on antitakeover and payout restrictions at the state level.
Section V investigates various plausible interpretations associated with location effects. Section VI concludes.
I. Data
Our sample includes publicly traded U.S. firms that are covered by Compustat over the period of 1988 to 2003. We exclude financial and utility firms (with industry code 4900-4999 and 6000-6999), because their financing policies are subject to the impact of regulation. We also delete firms with assets less than 20 million dollars from the sample, as these smaller firms are more likely to face various constraints on their financing policies. Similarly, because corporate financing policies for younger firms are more likely to be affected by policies established before the firms become public, we require that a firm stay in the CRSP data for at least 5 consecutive years before entering the sample. Finally, we get 39,287 firm-year observations for 4,118 different firms.
We define a firm's location as the MSA, where the firm is headquartered. This definition is justified by the fact that metropolitan areas are usually clusters of firm headquarters (Davis and Henderson, 2004 MSA as a major metropolitan area in the sample, we require that at least 20 sample firms each year are located in the metropolitan area and that there are at least 200 firm-year observations over the whole sample period. In total, we identify 27 large metropolitan areas in our sample that meet the above criteria. Our analysis focuses on the impact of each metropolitan area on the corporate financial polices of firms located in the area. We use the remaining firms that do not belong to any of the 27 metropolitan areas as the reference sample in our analysis.
We employ the Compustat annual file to obtain firms' financial information. In this paper, we focus on two corporate financial policy variables that are related to capital structure of frims:
Leverage and cash holding. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets and cash holding is calculated as cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets. Throughout this study, our analysis controls for five firm-specific variables: size, return on assets, market to book ratio, asset tangibility and the volatility of cash flows. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is EBITDA deflated by total assets.
Market to book ratio, a proxy for growth opportunities, is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Tangibility defined as net property, plant and equipment by total assets is used as a proxy for liquidation value if the firm is in financial distress. Cash flow volatility, a proxy for business conditions and uncertainty of firm fundamentals, is computed using the firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. We use these five variables are our base control variables. We further use additional variables in different tests.
Panel A of Table I 
II. Location and Capital Structure

A. Methodology
This subsection discusses the main methodology we employ to evaluate the impact of firm headquarters location on corporate financial structure. In our analysis, we perform a baseline regression by regressing each financial policy variable on year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the control variables. Next, we incorporate the fixed effects of headquarters locations and examine the joint significance and explanatory power of firm locations. More specifically, we estimate two regressions for each dependent variable:
(1)
where y it represents a financial policy variable, α t is the year fixed effect, γ IN D are industry fixed effects, X it are firm-level control variables, and it is an error term. We employ Fama-French (1997) 43 industry classifications. λ M SA in Equation (2) are fixed effects of firm locations. We use 27 location dummy variables for the 27 MSAs. All sample firms not included in the 27
MSAs form the reference sample. One possible concern with this procedure is that the metra area fixed effects may simply pick up the distinction in capital structure between urban and rural firms. For example, Loughran (2008) finds that, due to the difficulty of obtaining information, rural firms are less likely to conduct seasoned equity offerings than firms located in urban areas.
To address this problem, we estimate model (2) as well on a sample that consists of firm-year observations for which firms are located in the 27 large MSAs.
It is crucial to control for industry fixed effects in both models since the existing literature suggests that many industries tend to cluster around a geographic area due to the consideration of positive externalities. For example, many high technology firms tend to cluster in California and, on average, have a low leverage. Controlling for industry effects ensures that the fixed effects of firm locations are not simply picking up sector characteristics. Finally, we use clustered standard errors to adjust for the correlation within a firm over time in our pooled analysis. Table II reports estimation results of models (1) and (2) on corporate leverage and cash holdings, separately. All regressions include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and firm-level control variables, such as logarithm of total assets, market to book ratio, the rate of return on assets, asset tangibility, and cash flow volatility. We also use an alternative model with more control variables, such as stock return volatility, net working capital, R&D to total assets, capital expenditure to total assets, and depreciation to total assets. Our basic regression results hold.
B. Baseline Results
We find substantial evidence that firm location has a significant impact on corporate policies, after controlling for both firm characteristics and industry effects. The F −statistics are large enough to reject the joint hypothesis that metropolitan areas bear no effects on leverage or cash holdings. The F −statistic equals 5.36 for leverage and 11.3 for cash holdings. Interestingly, the significant MSA effects do not subsume the industry effects, which are also highly significant across all regressions. Our estimation of model (2) 
C. Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we conduct a host of robustness checks that include the significance of the MSA fixed effects over time, alternative estimation technique, and alternative industry definition.
All these tests corroborate the robustness of our baseline evidence of the location effect on financial policy.
C.1 Time-Series Analysis
We estimate both the cross-sectional regressions by year and the pooled regressions for three subperiods. In the yearly cross-sectional analysis, we include industry fixed effects, MSA fixed effects, and other firm-level control variables in the regression. We further estimate pooled cross-sectional regressions for each of the three subperiods: 1988-1992, 1993-1998, and 1999-2003 . Table III shows that the results are generally stable over time. For both leverage and cash holdings, the MSA fixed effects are consistently significant in each sample year and over different time periods.
C.2 Alternative Estimation Techniques
The pooling of cross-sectional and time-series data in our regressions may create correlation of errors at the firm level. Instead of clustering the standard errors at the firm level, we employ an alternative technique - Newey-West (1987) specification with a lag of one. The unreported results indicate that the F −statistics for the joint significance of MSA fixed effects are even higher than those reported in Table II .
Another way to address the possible serial correlation at the firm level is to collapse the data at the area-firm level. Starting with the firm-year data, we regress the two financing policies of interest on the year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and control variables at the firm level.
Then, we extract firm-year residuals from the above regressions and collapse these residuals by the area-firm level. Finally, we estimate the MSA fixed effects in the collapsed residuals. We find that our baseline evidence is robust to this alternative estimation technique.
C.3 Alternative Industry Definition
We replicate the regressions in Tables II and III The unreported results indicate that the joint effect of 2-digit industry classifications is also significant for leverage and cash holdings. There is little variation in the statistical significance of MSA fixed effects, confirming our baseline evidence.
C.4 Location and Capital Structure Choices
This subsection focuses on the capital structure choices made by firms when raising external capital. Examining incremental capital raising decisions using discrete choice analysis allows us to identify corporate headquarters location effects at times when firms decide to refinance or change their capital structure. We identify financing decisions by relative changes in debt and equity and calculate changes in amounts of outstanding equity and debt for each firm in each year. Amount of equity issued is defined as sale of common and preferred stock minus any purchase of common and preferred stock, scaled by total assets. Amount of debt issued is calculated as long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt retirement, scaled by total assets.
An equity-issue dummy equals 1 if a firm's net equity issues are equal to or greater than 5% in a year and 0 if otherwise, while a debt-issue dummy equals 1 if a firm's net long-term debt issues are greater than 0 in a year, and 0 if otherwise. The descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Panel A, Table I . Net long-term debt issues of firms has a mean of 3.3 percent, and net equity issues has a mean of 5 percent. 34.1 percent of firms, on average, issue long-term debt, and 15.1 percent issue equity.
We estimate the basic model specification for the financing choice variables, and the results are presented in Table IV . Interestingly, metra areas have joint significant effects on firms'
capital structure choices. Specifically, the F −statistic equals 3.69 for stock issues and 2.78 for debt issues. It is even higher of 5.37 for the decision of equity issues, and of 3.18 for that of debt issues. Compared with the unreported estimation results without MSA fixed effects, the explanatory power of the regressions increases substantially. The evidence suggests that corporate headquarters location has a significant impact on capital financing activity.
III. Credit Market Conditions, State Regulations, and Capital Structure
Thus far, the geographic location of corporate headquarters exhibits a substantially significant impact on firms' financial structure, and the magnitude of the location effect is economically significant. As discussed in the introduction, the significant location effect could well capture the impact of local "fundamentals", rather than the location effect, on corporate financing policies.
This section examines the impact of the local "fundamentals" on financial policies, particularly whether our results are driven by local credit market conditions and state regulations.
A. Credit Market Conditions
Up to 1978, the U.S. banking system was segregated, with 50 banking systems, one per state. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Zarutskie (2006) provide evidence that bank competition significantly affects individual firms' financing policies. 5
Our analysis therefore incorporates the banking condition into our specification to ensure that the location effect is not simply proxying for the variation in financial sector development across MSAs.
To assess the development of the financial sector in each MSA, we focus on commercial banks and obtain their balance sheet information from their Reports of Condition and Income, required by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. We construct three variables to capture the banking condition for each MSA, namely nonperformance loans, commercial loans to sales, and the Herfindahl index of commercial loans. We use nonperformance loans as an indicator for bank lending quality, and it is defined as the fraction of total loans classified as "nonperforming".
All loans of 90 days or more past due but still accruing and non-accrual loans are classified as nonperforming loans (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996) . Next, we compute the weighted average of nonperforming loans for all commercial banks headquartered in the same MSA, taking each bank's commercial loans as the weight. Commercial loans are the sum of commercial and industrial loans and commercial real estate loans. Commercial loan category measures the flow of bank credit to industries and thus is "likely to be closely linked to commercial investment and economic conditions" (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996) . We incorporate the three proxies for banking conditions into the baseline specification model (2) and present the regression estimates in Panel A, Table IV . The results show that banking conditions are significantly correlated with firm policies. The ratio of commercial loans to sales is positively related to firm leverage, suggesting that firms may be inclined to use more bank loans if the banking sector is relatively large. Firm cash holdings are negatively associated with bank depth. With abundant bank loans available, firms would find it easier to make shortterm loan arrangements and accordingly reduce their cash holdings. Results, however, show that the banking condition variables have no joint significant effects on financing policies, and that controlling for the credit market condition neither reduces the significance of the location effect nor increases the model's explanatory power substantially. For both financing policies, the significance of the F value and the size of the adjusted R−square remain substantially the same as their baseline counterparts reported in Table II .
We also consider alternative measures of bank health and depth of financial structure. For example, we replace the weighted-average nonperformance loans and the ratio of commercial loans to firm sales by the weighted-average of charge-off and the ratio of total bank assets to firm assets, respectively. These replacements yield no material change in our findings. We also examine the relationship between regional economic growth and corporate financial policies, and the untabulated results further suggest no material change in our statistical inferences.
In summary, the evidence from Table IV suggests that, while the variables of banking conditions have a significant impact on capital structure, their overall impact has no bearing on the significance of location effects.
B. State Regulations
In the U.S., all public corporations are subject to the business incorporation statutes of the state where they are incorporated. Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) Zwiebel (1996) and Novaes and Zingales (1995) argue that managers use leverage to reduce the threat of a hostile takeover. Thus, if a firm is protected by antitakeover state regulations, its management would prefer a lower leverage. The payout restriction statute typically requires a minimum ratio between the amount of book capital and debt before making a dividend payment or share repurchase. Firms subject to payout restrictions are limited in the amount of debt they can issue, resulting in a lower leverage ratio (Wald and Long, 2006 it is equal to 1.
B.1 General Evidence
We subsequently incorporate the two state regulation variables into the basic specification model To summarize, incorporating state statutes on antitakeover and payout restrictions into our model has no material effect on the significance of location effects on firm capital structure.
Moreover, state statutes contribute little to the explanatory power of the model.
B.2 Delaware-Incorporated and California-Headquartered Firms
This subsection addresses possible concerns that our location effect on corporate capital structure may be driven by state regulations and state policies, but that variables on antitakeover statutes and payout restrictions are unable to capture the overall impact of these policies and regulations well. These concerns prompt us to study two interesting samples of firms: (i) We estimate Model (1) with these two subsamples of firms, separately, and report the results in Panels B and C of Table V . As shown in panel B, it is evident that the location effect is significant for both financing policies for Delaware-incorporated firms, suggesting a substantial variation in financing policies across MSAs not driven by state laws. The self-selection hypothesis of Wald and Long (2006) postulates that firms choose their incorporation state based on their own policy style. For example, if a firm wants to maintain high debt level, they may choose to incorporate in a state where the payout restriction law is less restricted. As a result, firms that choose the same incorporation state should exhibit more similarity in their policy style.
But we still find significant differences in their policies across MSAs. 6 Panel C shows that, for California-headquartered firms, the MSA fixed effects are significant for the two capital structure policies. This piece of evidence suggests that, even within the same state, there is a considerable difference in financing policies across MSAs. Overall, Panels B and C provide strong evidence on the existence of corporate location effect.
IV. Interpretations of Location Effects
The previous sections have documented that the location effect on capital structure is both statistically significant and economically important. The results are robust with respect to proxies for local financial sector condition and state regulation variables, suggesting that the headquarter location effect is not solely driven by local "fundamentals." We now proceed to explore potential explanations for the location effect that include non-economic factors.
A. Investor Clienteles and Location Effects
Before we move to the non-market determinants of corporate policies, we first consider the possibility that the location effects could reflect catering to investor preference by corporations.
Investors exhibit a strong preference for geographic proximity in their portfolio allocation decisions, because they may have a relative information advantage in investing in local firms, or simply they are more familiar with companies that are headquartered close by. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that U.S. professional money managers tend to invest in firms that are headquartered geographically close to them. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu (2002) uncover similar patterns for individual investors. Using international data, Massa and Simonov (2006) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
B. Culture and Location Effects
The conformity in financing policies among local firms could be driven by non-economic factors such as culture. Cultural value theories suggest that culture shapes moral attitudes, habits and customs, and the legal, political, and economic systems, and that it steers individual behavior. There is a growing body of works studying how to integrate cultural aspects into the analysis of financial problems. For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Chui, Titman, and Wei (2008) study the cultural effect on stock market investment behavior. These studies find that the stock selection of both institution and household investors is affected by firms' official language and the cultural background of their chief executives, and that cross-country cultural differences are associated with the returns of of momentum strategies. Griffin et al. (2008) demonstrate that capital structure decisions of foreign joint ventures are affected by the cultural background of foreign managers. United States is a geographically large and diverse country. Culture and other socioeconomic factors vary substantially across regions. For example, Southern culture has been generally more conservative than that of the North, and such cultural differences could impact corporate policies. Thus, it seems plausible that the location effect is potentially related to the immediate institutional environment or the social context of a firm's location.
We therefore investigate the effect of culture using explicitly defined culture variables. Specifically, we examine two aspects of culture, religion and trust, that play an important role in corporate decision-making. Existing research documents a negative relationship between an individual's attitude towards risk and religiosity. 7 Hillary, Paris, and Hui (2009) further find that the relation between individual risk aversion and religiosity influences firm behavior. Specifically, firms located in US counties with high levels of religiosity display lower risk exposure. As a result, these firms require a higher internal rate of return on their investment, leading to lower investment rates and lower long-term growth rates.
Interpersonal trust is also associated with people's attitude toward risk. "Trust is the 'willingness to take risk', and the level of trust is an indicator of the amount of risk that one is willing to take" (Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, 2007) . Interpersonal trust has been studied extensively in many social science research disciplines. The claim that interpersonal trust can affect organization and individual behavior has been affirmed by abundant evidence. In particular, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Osoba, 2003; Hillary, Paris, and Hui, 2009. participants who attend church at least once a week. As for religious denomination, we find the percentage of people who belong to Protestant based on the question: "Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one?"
Panel B, Table VI shows the regression estimates. Some interesting results emerge. First, cultural variables are jointly significant for cash holdings but not for leverage. Specifically, interpersonal trust has no significant effect on either leverage or cash holdings. The two religion variables, the intensity of church attendance and the percentage of Protestants, are positively related to leverage and negatively related to cash holdings. But only the relation with cash holdings is significant or marginally significant. The results suggest that firms headquartered in regions with higher level of religiosity tend to use more debt and hold less cash. The MSA fixed effects remain strongly significant for both capital structure variables,suggesting that, while part of the location effects of corporate policies could be explained by cultural variables, the fixed effects of firm location capture some non-cultural effects.
C. Social Interaction and Location Effects
While culture and other social factors can shape the value and behavior of corporate managers fundamentally, social interaction can facilitate culture transmission within a social context. Firm managers' embeddedness in social networks serves as a major channel of conveying information and ideas about firm behavior (Granovetter, 1985) . This proposition can be further justified by two facts. First, firm managers are acknowledged to imprint their mark on a wide range of corporate policies. For example, personal attributes of corporate executives and particularly their management styles can affect acquisition or diversification decisions, dividend policy, interest coverage, cost-cutting policy (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) , investment policy (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) , and corporate risk management (Beber and Fabbri, 2006) . Hence, corporate decision making is, to a certain degree, rooted in firm managers' background.
Second, corporate managers, through both market and non-market interactions with peers, can be influenced by network contacts in decision making. Social scientists suggest that analogy plays an important role in perceiving and framing the decision situation, as well as in comparison of the alternatives. Thus, analogy may unify the mechanisms of decision-making. Operating in an uncertain environment, firm officials may look to their peers for ideas about appropriate strategies or mimic one another's behavior through direct contact.
Recent studies suggest that social interaction with peers has tangible effects on a wide range of firm activities from adoption of antitakeover procedures (Davis and Greve, 1997) , corporate borrowing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 2003) , acquisition decisions (Haunschild, 1993) to charitable actions (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2005) and political contributions (Mizruchi, 1989 and 1992) . More recently, Kedia and Rajgopal (2008) study the "neighborhood effects" in corporate compensation policy, where the peer effects are clearly location based. They find that firms grant more options to rank and file workers when a higher fraction of firms in the local community grant more broad-based options. John and
Kadyrzhanova (2008) The social interaction effect should be especially important for local firms because geographic proximity facilitates face-to-face interaction and makes contact/relationship easier to start and maintain. Furthermore, geographic proximity facilitates observational learning even without direct contact. Simple exposure to the strategies of other firms may prompt firms to adopt similar strategies and to align their activities with other firms in the local geographic community.
Naturally, we hypothesize that social interaction matters for corporate financial policy, i.e., firm managers may get some input from their peers and take into account when they make firm financial strategies.
Our empirical analysis in the previous section shows that location effects exist after controlling for state-level economic and regulation variables. The earlier results in this section further show that the location effect is not fully explained by investor characteristics/preference variables or local cultural attributes. Here we provide additional tests on the location effect.
Because social interactions and relationship among corporate executives are not directly observable, we attempt to control for possible influences on corporate policies that are not local. We employ the classification of nine census regions and identify each firm's region as the census region where the firm is headquartered. The fixed effects of regions capture possible variation with respect to income characteristics, industrial composition of the employed labor force, and such noneconomic factors as demographic, social, and cultural characteristics among regions.
Though both metropolitan areas and census regions can capture some variation in socioeconomic characteristics, it is evident that census regions serve better for this purpose. In contrast, as for the capability to capture the interaction among managers, metropolitan areas work better than census regions. If social interaction is largely a local phenomenon, and the intensity of interaction among firm managers at the regional level could decline substantially due to the distance. Thus, integrating both the fixed effects of metropolis and fixed effects of regions into our model specification enables us to isolate the effect of managerial interaction from the possible effect of socioeconomic factors.
Regression results reported in Panel C, Table VI reveal several notable observations. First, integrating industry and region fixed effects does not alter the significance of the MSA fixed effects, even though the F value of the joint test declines to some extent. For example, the F value of the joint significance of metropolitan areas fixed effects on cash holdings decreases from 10.27 (in the specification with no region fixed effects) to 5.55 (in the specification with region fixed effects). Hence, the similarity in capital structure is largely local, and evidence of "local peer effects" is strongly supported by the data. Second, the significance of the joint effect of regions varies with different capital structure policies. In particular, the fixed effects of regions are insignificant for leverage, implying that the regional socioeconomic characteristics have no significant effects on this policy variable beyond the local effects. However, the region fixed effects are significant for cash holdings, indicating that this policy variable is affected by regional socioeconomic characteristics.
V. Conclusion
This paper documents a significant location effect on corporate capital structure. The location effect is consistently significant over different time periods and robust to alternative industry classifications and various estimation techniques. We further demonstrate that this location effect is robust to the varying degrees of banking market development at the local level and to different state statutes on antitakeover and payout restrictions. We then explore three hypotheses to interpret the location effect, i.e., the location effect can be ascribed to companies' catering to investor preference, to regional culture characteristics, and to social interactions among firm managers. The evidence from our analysis shows that while local investor preference and regional culture have impact on corporate policies, they do not explain away the location effect.
We interpret the location effects as largely representing a "local peer effect".
Our study provides a new dimension for future studies to examine corporate policy. Our findings suggest that, in addition to fundamental firm-specific characteristics or observable managerial traits, geographic location can also have a significant impact on corporations' policy making. Zwiebel, Jeffrey H., 1996, Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment, American
Economic Review 86, 1197-1215.
Table I Summary Statistics
The table summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The sample consists of 39,287 firm-year observations for 4,104 different firms. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and short-term investments standardized by total assets. Assets are in millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. Nonperformance loan is the fraction of total loans that are non-accruals or 90 days or more past due but still accruing. The ratio of commercial loans to sales is measured by the ratio of total volume of commercial loans to the total volume of firm sales in each metropolitan area. The Herfindahl index of commercial loans is constructed by summing over the squared market share of commercial loans from each individual commercial bank in a metropolitan area. This table presents results of regressing a firm's financial policy (leverage or cash holdings) against firmspecific characteristics, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and with/without MSA fixed effects. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are based on clustered standard errors, and the models are estimated with unreported year fixed effects. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and short-term investments standardized by total assets. Assets are in log millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. The number of constraints associated with the F test for industry fixed effects is 42 and for MSA fixed effects is 27 in columns 2 and 5 and 26 in columns 3 and 6. This table shows results from the cross-sectional regressions year by year and over different subperiods. For each dependent variable, the yearly regression specification includes industry fixed effects, metro area fixed effects, and firm characteristics (asset, market to book ratio, return on assets, asset tangibility, and cash flow volatility), whereas the regression specification over subperiods adds year fixed effects. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and short-term investments standardized by total assets. Assets are in log millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. Columns (2) and (6) report F −statistics for the joint significance of metro area fixed effects. Columns (3) and (7) report p-values for the test. The number of constraints for MSA fixed effects are 26, 27, and 27 for subperiods 1988-1992, 1993-1998, and 1999-2003 Obs.
(8) This table presents results of regressing a firm's capital raising events (equity issues and debt issues) against firm-specific characteristics, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and MSA fixed effects. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are based on clustered standard errors, and the models are estimated with unreported year fixed effects. Equity issues is defined as sale of common and preferred stock (#108) minus any purchase of common and preferred stock (#115) scaled by total assets. Debt issues is calculated as long-term debt issuance (#111) minus long-term debt retirement (#114) scaled by total assets. Equity issues dummy equals 1 if a firm's net equity issues are equal to or greater than 5% in a year and 0 if otherwise, while debt issues dummy equals 1 if a firm's net long-term debt issues are greater than 0 in a year, and 0 if otherwise. Assets are in log millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. This table presents the effects of credit market conditions on financing policies. For each dependent variable, the regression model includes year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, metro area fixed effects, firms characteristics, and three variables for credit market conditions -the ratio of nonperforming loan, the ratio of commercial loans to sales, and the Herfindahl index. Nonperformance loan is the fraction of total loans that are non-accruals or 90 days or more past due but still accruing. The ratio of commercial loans to sales is measured by the ratio of total volume of commercial loans to the total volume of firm sales in each metropolitan area. The Herfindahl index of commercial loans is constructed by summing over the squared market share of commercial loans from each individual commercial bank in a metropolitan area. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and short-term investments standardized by total assets. Assets are in millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. All the t-ratios are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. This table presents the effects of state statutes on capital structure. For each dependent variable, the regression model includes year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, metro area fixed effects, firm characteristics, banking condition variables, and two variables for state regulations -the index of antitakeover statutes and payout restriction variable. The index of antitakeover statutes is the sum of points assigned to five state antitakeover statutes. The variable of payout restriction is 1.25 for California (CA) and Alaska, 0 for Delaware (DE), Maine, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, and 1 for the remaining states. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and short-term investments standardized by total assets. Assets are in millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. Nonperformance loan is the fraction of total loans that are non-accruals or 90 days or more past due but still accruing. The ratio of commercial loans to sales is measured by the ratio of total volume of commercial loans to the total volume of firm sales in each metropolitan area. The Herfindahl index of commercial loans is constructed by summing over the squared market share of commercial loans from each individual commercial bank in a metropolitan area. All the t-ratios are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The number of constraints associated with the F test for industry fixed effects is 42 for All States and Delaware-incorporated firms and 36 for California-headquartered firms, and the number of constraints associated with the F test for MSA fixed effects is 27 for All States, 21 for DE-incorporated firms, and 2 for CA-headquartered firms. This table presents the effects of investor clienteles, culture, and social interactions on capital structure. For each dependent variable, the regression model includes year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, metro area fixed effects, firm characteristics, banking condition variables, state regulation variables, and clientele and culture variables. Per capita investment income is defined as income derived from dividends, interest and rent. Interpersonal trust is defined as the percentage of respondents who answered "yes" to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Church attendance is the percentage of participants who attend church at least once a week. The percentage of Protestant is the percentage of people who belong to Protestant based on the question: "Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one?" Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash holdings is calculated as cash and short-term investments standardized by total assets. Assets are in millions of dollars. Market to book ratio is defined as total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the year-end closing price times the number of shares outstanding over total assets. Return on assets is EBITDA deflated by total assets. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment over total assets. Cash flow volatility is computed based on a firm's standard deviation of quarterly cash flows for the past five years. Nonperformance loan is the fraction of total loans that are non-accruals or 90 days or more past due but still accruing. The ratio of commercial loans to sales is measured by the ratio of total volume of commercial loans to the total volume of firm sales in each metropolitan area. The Herfindahl index of commercial loans is constructed by summing over the squared market share of commercial loans from each individual commercial bank in a metropolitan area. The index of antitakeover statutes is the sum of points assigned to five state antitakeover statutes. The variable of payout restriction is 1.25 for California (CA) and Alaska, 0 for Delaware (DE), Maine, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, and 1 for the remaining states. All the t-ratios are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The number of constraints associated with the F test for income variables is 2, for culture variables is 3, and for region fixed effects is 8. The number of constraints associated with the F test for industry fixed effects is 42 and for MSA fixed effects is 27. The sample period is 1988-2003. 
